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Interviewing in professional labor markets is a costly process for
￿rms. Moreover, poor screening can have a persistent negative impact
on ￿rms￿bottom lines and candidates￿careers. In a simple dynamic
model where ￿rms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have pri-
vate information about their own ability, potentially large ine¢ ciencies
arise from information-based unemployment, where able workers are
rejected by ￿rms because of their lack of o⁄ers in previous interviews.
This e⁄ect may make the market less e¢ cient than random matching.
We show that the ￿rst best can be achieved using either a mechanism
with transfers or one without transfers.
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11 Introduction
The process of screening professional workers through interviews is costly
for ￿rms. Banks, consulting ￿rms, and manufacturing ￿rms dedicated be-
tween 7%-9% of the total compensation (base salaries) of ￿rst year hires to
recruiting sta⁄ salaries in 2006.1 The time cost of recruiting is also large -
in 2006, it took between 41 and 99 days to ￿ll executive jobs at these ￿rms.2
Furthermore, when ￿rms outsource the recruiting to headhunters, they pay
up to one third of the new hire￿ s ￿rst year base salary.3
The interview process can be very costly for workers as well. Despite
￿rms￿attempts at screening, asymmetric information may persist4, and the
poor placement of a good candidate may seriously impact the candidate￿ s
career prospects. Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz (2005) ￿nd that grad-
uates entering a labor market in a recession have large earnings losses and
take approximately 10 years to reach the same footing as graduates entering
during normal times.5 Oyer (2006) ￿nds that in the market for academic
economists, initial placement at a school one rank higher leads to work at
an institution ranked .6 places higher 3 to 15 years in the future.
In this paper, we construct a model of an entry-level professional labor
market (such as those for lawyers, MBAs, academics, and others) where
applicants have private information about their abilities and ￿rms can in-
terview applicants at a cost to uncover that information. In the model, we
￿nd a large ine¢ ciency in the hiring process that we call information-based
unemployment. This phenomenon arises when a ￿rm decides not to inter-
view (and therefore rejects) an applicant who has not previously received an
o⁄er in the hiring process. The lack of an o⁄er creates a bad signal about
1From Sta¢ ng.org￿ s 2006 survey ￿Recruiting Metrics and Performance Benchmark Re-
port￿ .
2From the same survey. We present two caveats about the data on time spent recruiting.
First, it does not apply solely to entry-level professional workers. Second, it is a rough
measure of the actual cost of time. For example, if multiple Senior Partners from a
consulting ￿rm dedicate a day to recruiting, the opportunity cost could be very large. Of
course, we are not including travel costs or physical expenses either.
3￿Net fails to oust networking: Headhunters￿ , by Michael Dempsey, Financial Times,
July 16, 2003. To get a sense of how much money this is per recruit, an MBA graduating
from a top 50 program in 2006 earned $94,447. Based on authors￿tabulation from data
gathered in U.S. News & World Report￿ s Full Time Business School Rankings 2007.
4Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) demonstrate that education
level matters less relative to inherent ability as a worker￿ s career develops. This implies
that the asymmetric information problem can be important for entry level positions.
5Kahn (2007) ￿nds that negative wage e⁄ects persist beyond 10 years and also provides
evidence on mismatch between workers and jobs.
2what previous interviews had uncovered about the applicant. This unem-
ployment could, and in some cases, should be avoided, since the rejected
applicant may actually be a good match for the ￿rm. We demonstrate that
these ine¢ ciencies may be so large that randomly matching applicants to
￿rms can achieve a larger surplus than the interview process.
Information-based unemployment is a robust feature of the interview
process - it occurs whether job o⁄ers are open or exploding, no matter how
many rounds of interviewing are added to the hiring process, and for di⁄erent
information structures. These results are relevant for any matching market
that involves costly screening, such as those where lenders give money to
borrowers, individuals seek to purchase homes, and the market for corporate
control.
We also prove that e¢ ciency in the market can be achieved through
market design. Both a mechanism with transfers and one without trans-
fers implement the optimal match. Market design, once limited to more
centralized markets such as ￿The Match￿ for residents to hospitals,6 has
become an issue of great relevance. Roth and Xing (1994) describe a mul-
titude of attempts to regulate matching markets (Federal Court Clerkships,
MBA job market, Clinical Psychology Internships, College Football Bowls
among others) by instituting timing rules, restrictions on types of o⁄ers, and
matching mechanisms. Roth, Cawley, Levine, Niederle and Siegfried (2007)
have redesigned aspects of the graduate economics job market, adding the
possibility of signaling interest to universities as well as a post-market ￿job
scramble￿as a ￿nal market clearing stage. Some business schools even con-
duct auctions for interviews, using a ￿xed budget constraint to make bidding
costly.7
Our model is simple. Firms have observable productivities, applicants
have abilities that are private information and matches create a surplus that
depends monotonically on both and is split proportionally by the ￿rm and
applicant. In order to ￿nd out applicant abilities, ￿rms can interview them
at a cost. There is an interview schedule in which an applicant is matched to
one ￿rm in the ￿rst period and another ￿rm in the second period. Although
we consider a two-period model, our results are robust to adding additional
periods.
There is a large literature on labor market matching with perfect infor-
mation (for example, see Kelso and Crawford (1982)). Several recent papers
have examined decentralized labor markets where information about worker
6For a description, see Roth (2003).
7For a theoretical analysis, see S￿nmez and Unver (2007).
3abilities is symmetric between ￿rms and workers and is gradually revealed
over time. Roth and Xing (1994) examine unraveling in such a model, al-
lowing for centralized matching to take place in the ￿nal period. Unraveling
is also the focus of Li and Rosen (1998), who analyze a two-period model
with risk averse agents.8 Niederle and Roth (2007) theoretically and exper-
imentally study a particular nine period market allowing for both exploding
o⁄ers and open o⁄ers. They ￿nd that exploding o⁄ers promote early and
dispersed transactions and that open o⁄ers create late and thick markets.
Two current papers allow for asymmetric information in decentralized la-
bor markets.9 Niederle and Yaariv (2007) analyze an in￿nite-horizon model
that allows for both exploding and open o⁄ers and di⁄erent degrees of infor-
mation asymmetries. Their model di⁄ers from ours in that it allows ￿rms to
make o⁄ers to any worker and does not have any costly discovery of infor-
mation (as we do through interviews). Moreover, their focus is on su¢ cient
conditions for the existence of equilibria that implement the stable match.
Chakraborty, Citanna, and Ostrovsky (2007) examine matching when ￿rms
have private imperfect signals about each worker￿ s type. They prove that
there is no mechanism which can get truthful revelation from ￿rms and
match workers and ￿rms e¢ ciently in the sense that there are no blocking
worker-￿rm pairs after the match. Since they are concerned with optimal-
ity, they don￿ t characterize what ine¢ ciencies may arise.10 We are actually
able to ￿nd optimal mechanisms for our environment for two reasons. First,
in our ￿rst mechanism we allow workers to reveal their own types through
prices, which eliminates the ￿rms￿incentive problems. Second, the signals
that ￿rms receive are perfect in our model which doesn￿ t allow room for
blocking pairs.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we analyze a simple
model with two ￿rms and two applicants. In Section 3, we generalize the
results to multiple ￿rms and applicants. In Section 4, we look at welfare.
In Section 5, we examine the robustness of the information structure. In
Section 6, we look at correcting market ine¢ ciencies through market design.
In Section 7, we conclude.
8Li and Suen (2000), Suen (2000), and Li and Suen (2004) all extend the model of Li
and Rosen (1998) to further examine unraveling. Damiano, Li, and Suen (2005) examine
unraveling in a search environment where the horizon is ￿nite.
9Lee and Schwarz (2007a and 2007b) examine information acquisition about candidates
through interviews when matching is centralized.
10Although they do speculate that in a dynamic model such as ours, the signaling e⁄ect
of o⁄ers can cause ine¢ ciencies.
42 A Simple Model with Two Applicants and Two
Firms
We start by examining the case of two ￿rms and two applicants. In Section
3 we show that the analysis of this simple case extends to the general case
of multiple ￿rms and applicants.
There are two ￿rms i = 1;2 of publicly observable productivity f1 and
f2, where f2 > f1 > 0; and two applicants, j = 1;2; of privately observable
productivity xj 2 fL;M;Hg; where H > M > L > 0: The realization
of the types of the two applicants are independent and determined by the
probabilities pL; pM; and pH, which are all positive and sum to one:
The game has two periods. The timing is as follows. At the start of
the game, nature draws the types of the two applicants and the order in
which they are matched with the two ￿rms. In period 1, the ￿rms observe
the order of matches and the type of the applicant they are ￿rst matched
with, but not the type of the other applicant.11 For notational clarity, we
de￿ne the matches in period 1 as ￿rm 1 with applicant 1 and ￿rm 2 with
applicant 2. After observing the applicant￿ s type the ￿rms decide whether or
not to make the applicant they are matched with an o⁄er. The applicants
decide whether or not to accept the o⁄er. In period 2, the ￿rms observe
all the o⁄ers and responses from the ￿rst period. The ￿rms are matched
with the applicants they did not match with in period 1. Conditional on
their information, each ￿rm decides whether to interview the applicant it is
matched with in the second period at a cost of ￿c > 0; where ￿ 2 (0;1):
The ￿rm then chooses whether to make the applicant an o⁄er or not. We
also allow ￿rms (i) to make o⁄ers to applicants they are matched with even
if they did not interview them and (ii) to make their period 1 applicants an
o⁄er in period 2 if they had not done so already.
To summarize, the interview schedule for the two applicant-two ￿rm
game is:
Firm 1 Firm 2
Period 1 applicant x1 applicant x2
Period 2 applicant x2 applicant x1
We assume that the surplus from a match is multiplicative: a ￿rm with
productivity fi who hires an applicant of ability xj creates a surplus ￿ij =
fixj. The players split the surplus from the match: ￿rms get ￿￿ij and
11Hence we assume zero interview costs in period 1. This adds tractability and makes
it feasible for some hiring to occur.
5applicants get (1￿￿)￿ij. This rule ensures that ￿rms prefer being matched
with higher ability applicants, applicants prefer being matched with higher
productivity ￿rms, and that in a frictionless market the ￿rst best match is
one of assortative matching. The results would be the same for monotonic
transformations of the surplus, ￿ij = g(fi)h(xj), where g0;h0 ￿ 0. We
take the sharing rule to be exogenous, but it clearly could result from some
bargaining process. We assume that there is a threshold or outside option
for ￿rms, which they receive should they not hire anyone equal to ￿fit. The
value of the threshold is common across ￿rms and H > M > t > L, implying
that neither ￿rm would willingly hire a type L applicant.12 Applicants
also have a reservation payo⁄. An applicant of productivity xj receives
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ wxj from not being hired.13 We assume that working is preferable
to not working, i.e. ￿ w < minffig. Finally, we assume that the the structure
of the game is common knowledge to all participants.
Firms can make open o⁄ers. We de￿ne an open o⁄er as an o⁄er extended
by the ￿rm to an applicant in period 1 that can be held by the applicant
in period 2. The applicant can accept the held o⁄er should it be more
attractive than their period 2 situation. In a working paper version of this
paper (Josephson and Shapiro (2008)), we show that our results also hold
for an exploding o⁄ers environment (i.e. where applicants can￿ t hold o⁄ers).
We restrict the parameters to look at speci￿c equilibria of the hiring












￿ c < fit; (A1)
fi((1 ￿ pH)M + pHH) ￿ c > fiM: (A2)
Assumption 0 says that the ￿rm would prefer to go unmatched rather
than to hire an applicant that is not of high type without interviewing her.
Assumption 1 says that the ￿rm would prefer to go unmatched rather than
interview an applicant when it doesn￿ t have the possibility of hiring a high
12Nevertheless, L applicants may still be hired in the model, when ￿rms decide to hire
without interviewing. Alternatively, a model where ￿rms make mistakes in their interview
process with small probabilities would have similar results and have L applicants hired in
equilibrium.
13Hence ￿rms (applicants) have reservation payo⁄s that increase in their productivity
(ability). This is not important for the results.
6type. Assumption 2 says that ￿rms who had a type M applicant in period 1
would prefer to interview in the second period in order to see if they could do
better. In addition to these assumptions, we will for expositional purposes
assume that if a ￿rm is matched with an applicant of the same type in
periods one and two, and it can hire either of them with probability one,
then it will always prefer the latter. These assumptions pin down parameters
for which information-based unemployment will occur:
Proposition 1 In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that satis￿es A0-A2:
i) If x2 = H, ￿rm 2 will hire applicant 2 either in period 1 or 2. If x2 = M
or L, ￿rm 2 will either interview applicant 1 and hire applicant 1 if she is
of type M or H or hire her without interviewing.
ii) In period 1, ￿rm 1 will either not make any o⁄ers to applicant 1 or mix
between making o⁄ers and not when x1 = M and H: In period 2, ￿rm 1
never interviews applicant 2 or makes her an o⁄er without interviewing her.
The proof is in the appendix.
In this model, ￿rm 1 will never be able to hire applicant 2 if she is of
type H: This implies (by A1) that it ￿nds it too costly to discover whether
the applicant is of type L or M and (by A0) that it will not make her an
o⁄er without interviewing her. If the draw of applicant types is such that
x1 = H and x2 = M, then it follows from Proposition 1 that ￿rm 2 will hire
applicant 1 (by A2), but that applicant 2 will remain unemployed.
Corollary 1 If x1 = H and x2 = M and A0-A2 hold, in any equilibrium
there is unemployment.
We refer to the unemployment of M types caused by the information
asymmetry as information-based unemployment. Speci￿cally, information-
based unemployment occurs when a ￿rm would have hired an applicant had
it known the applicant￿ s type, but both go unmatched due to asymmetric
information. Adding more periods to this game would not change the out-
come - ￿rm 1 would still refuse to interview or make an o⁄er to applicant 1
because its information set would not change. Moreover, as we will show in
Section 3, this e⁄ect is also robust to introducing more ￿rms and applicants.
In Section 4, we will analyze the welfare consequences of information-based
unemployment.
2.1 Schedule-Based Unemployment
Suppose that there are now three ￿rms with productivities f3 > f2 > f1 > 0
and three applicants who we will assume to have drawn types (unobserv-
7able to the ￿rms) x1 = H, x2 = H, and x3 = M. In an ideal job market,
all three applicants should match as they are above the thresholds of the
￿rms. However, in our frictional market, this may not occur. We de￿ned
information-based unemployment as unemployment due to asymmetric in-
formation and interview costs. Schedule-based unemployment arises because
the interview schedule allocates applicants randomly, creating potential for
mismatch.14 Consider the following interview schedule:
Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 1
Period 1 x2 = H x3 = M x1 = H
Period 2 x3 = M x1 = H x2 = H
Even with zero interview costs, this schedule will result in unemploy-
ment. Firm 3 would hire applicant 1 since it knows that she prefers its o⁄er
to that of ￿rm 1. Firm 2 would hire applicant 2 for the same reason. This
however, would leave ￿rm 1 without an applicant and applicant 3 without
a match, even though both of them would prefer to be matched with each
other. This is a clear situation where the unemployment is caused by the in-
terview schedule. Moreover, the problem could be solved simply, by adding
another period. Such a remedy corresponds to recommendations by Roth,
Cawley, Levine, Niederle and Siegfried (2007) for the economics job market
(using the ￿job scramble￿to clear the market).
Nevertheless, adding another period would not solve the problem if there
were positive interview costs.15 If assumption A2 holds, ￿rm 3 will wait until
the second period to hire, and then hire applicant 1. Firm 2 makes an o⁄er
to applicant 2 that is then accepted and doesn￿ t interview in period 2. Firm
1, on the other hand, doesn￿ t get either of its two applicants and applicant
3 remains unmatched. Therefore schedule-based unemployment still exists
with positive interview costs. If another period were added where ￿rm 1
would be scheduled to meet x3, would the ine¢ ciency disappear? If A0
and A1 hold, the answer is no. Firm 1 can infer that applicant 3 is not
type H by the fact that ￿rm 3 did not extend an o⁄er to applicant 3.
From A1, ￿rm 1 doesn￿ t ￿nd it worthwhile to spend the interview cost on
an applicant who isn￿ t type H, and A0 guarantees it doesn￿ t want to hire
14In the matching literature, this could be called a congestion e⁄ect. However, we will
show that it interacts with the asymmetric information to create more than a standard
congestion e⁄ect.
15In the next section we analyze the hiring game where there are more than two ￿rms
and two applicants. The equilibrium we discuss here is covered by Proposition 2 in that
section.
8without interviewing. Hence, information-based unemployment makes the
schedule-based unemployment robust to changes in the market.
3 The General Model
We now generalize the model to F ￿rms and X applicants in order to illus-
trate that information-based unemployment exists in a more realistic envi-
ronment. Consider the general case with ￿rms i = 1;:::;F of heterogeneous
productivities f1;:::;fF; with F ￿ 2. Applicants are labeled by j = 1;:::;X
and can still be one of three types: L;M; or H. We assume that applicants
are allocated according to an interview schedule which is random but has
the properties that (i) no applicant interviews with the same ￿rm twice, (ii)
only one applicant is allocated to each ￿rm in each period, and (iii) if there
are less or equal number of agents on one side of the market, they should
all be matched. We maintain assumptions A0, A1, and A2 for all ￿rms.
Proposition 2 In the general model where A0-A2 hold:
i) In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, ￿rms only interview their second-
period applicant or make her an o⁄er if she was interviewed by a lower
productivity ￿rm or unmatched in period 1.
ii) In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with F ￿ X, there exists a
draw of applicant productivities such that there will be at least one M type
unemployed.
The proof is in the appendix.
This proposition yields two key insights. First, not all ￿rms are inter-
viewing. The fact that a ￿rm does not interview or hire if it receives an
applicant from a more productive ￿rm in the second period is a consequence
of A0 and A1 - the inference is that the applicant is not that good. How-
ever, the fact that a ￿rm interviews if it receives an applicant from a less
productive ￿rm is not obvious and a consequence of A2, which states that
a ￿rm with an M (and thus also an L) applicant in period 1 is willing to
interview in period 2.
The second insight demonstrates that unemployment is a phenomenon
that can arise in the general model. Consider the situation where F = X
(unemployment trivially occurs if F < X). De￿ne a local maximizer to be a
￿rm that has a higher productivity than both the ￿rm it gives an applicant
to in period 2 and the ￿rm that it receives an applicant from in period 2.
Information-based unemployment occurs when an applicant of type M is not
hired by the local maximizer in period 1 and then does not get interviewed
9(or made an o⁄er) by the ￿rm it is matched with in period 2. Since at
least one local maximizer must exist for any set of ￿rms, there is always
a draw of applicant types such that information-based unemployment will
arise in any such labor market. Moreover, information-based unemployment
may exist not just where there is a local maximizer, but for any increasing
sequence of ￿rms, i.e. where ￿rm i receives an applicant in period 2 that was
matched with a more productive ￿rm in period 1, and gives its ￿rst period
applicant to a less productive ￿rm in period 2. The existence of schedule-
based unemployment, on the other hand, depends on the con￿guration of
￿rms and applicants.
Interestingly enough, although more applicants than ￿rms leads to un-
employment, it may prevent information-based unemployment. Consider
the case of two ￿rms and four applicants. If the two ￿rms do not interview
any applicants in common, there is no room for adverse selection.
On the other hand, when there are more ￿rms than applicants (i.e. F >
X), information-based unemployment is possible, but not guaranteed. First,
consider the case of three ￿rms with productivities f3 > f2 > f1, and two
applicants. The ￿rst applicant is of type H and matches with ￿rm 1 in
period 1 and ￿rm 3 in period 2, and the second applicant is of type M and
matches with ￿rm 3 in period 1 and ￿rm 2 in period 3. In this case, the
best ￿rm will hire H, but the M applicant will remain unemployed because
of the information problem. Second, consider the case of two ￿rms and one
applicant. In this case, the ￿rm of highest productivity will always end up
hiring the applicant if she is not of type L, implying no unemployment.
4 Welfare
It is clear that the interview process that we describe does not achieve the
￿rst best of assortative matching, nor does it reach the constrained ￿rst best
of matching using the preset interview schedule when there is full informa-
tion about applicants￿abilities. When discussing welfare, we then want to
know how poorly the market performs. In this section, we show that the
performance of the interview process can be so poor that it may not even
beat the situation where there are no interviews and matching is random.
We begin by comparing the interview process to a slightly better bench-
mark, random matching with interviews. This essentially eliminates the
second period of the interview process, and is random matching except for
the fact that type L applicants can be discarded by ￿rms.
Proposition 3 Random matching with interviews can achieve a better ex-
10pected surplus than the interview process.
Consider the case of two ￿rms, i = 1;2, with productivities f2 > f1;
and two applicants. To make things as clear as possible, we will focus on
the equilibrium of this game where ￿rm 1 makes no o⁄ers16 and ￿rm 2
interviews ￿rm 1￿ s candidate when it doesn￿ t have an H type in the ￿rst
round.17 There are four possible applicant draws where there is a di⁄erence
between the ￿nal surplus with random matching with interviews and the
interview process: (L,M), (M,M), (M,H), and (L,H), where the ￿rst element
corresponds to the applicant assigned to ￿rm 2 in period 1. The expected
di⁄erence in total surplus between the two markets is:
ETS(Random with Interviews) ￿ ETS(Interview)
= ￿(f2 ￿ f1)(pLpM(M ￿ ￿t) + pLpH(H ￿ ￿t) + pMpHH)
+p2
M(f1M ￿ (￿f1t + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ wM)) + pMpH(f2M ￿ (￿f1t + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ wM))
+(1 ￿ pH)￿c:
We can break this di⁄erence into three parts. On the ￿rst line, the
di⁄erence is negative, since the interview process performs a screening role
and matches better applicants to better ￿rms. On the second line the dif-
ference is positive, since the interview process causes information-based un-
employment for surplus producing M applicants. Lastly, the interview cost
obviously weighs against interviewing.
It is clear that this di⁄erence is positive for su¢ ciently low f2 ￿ f1,
since that minimizes the negative part of the expression. The intuition for
why random matching with interviews can be better when f1 ￿ f2 is lower
is straightforward. Lowering heterogeneity among ￿rms makes the surplus
increase from screening less meaningful. Given that screening is costly both
16Recall that other equilibria involve ￿rm 1 mixing between making o⁄ers and not
making o⁄ers to M and H types in period one. If ￿rm 2 interviews ￿rm 1￿ s candidate
after observing ￿no o⁄er￿in these mixed strategy equilibria and in the equilibrium where
no o⁄ers are made, the only di⁄erence is that the interview cost is saved some fraction of
the time in the mixed strategy equilibria (since upon observing ￿o⁄er￿ , ￿rm 2 hires without
interviewing). If ￿rm 2 hires without interviewing ￿rm 1￿ s candidate after observing ￿no
o⁄er￿in these equilibria and the one where no o⁄ers are made, the outcomes are exactly
the same.
17Firm 2 might prefer to hire ￿rm 1￿ s ￿rst period candidate without interviewing (de-
pending on the parameters). In this case, the analysis also goes through. The only
di⁄erence is that instead of having the interview cost favor random matching, there is a
cost of ￿rm 2 getting stuck with an L type that favors random matching.
11in terms of causing information-based unemployment and the actual cost
of interviewing, random matching with interviews can dominate in terms of
welfare.18
Now suppose we compare the interview process with random matching
where interviews aren￿ t permitted.
Proposition 4 Random matching can achieve a better expected surplus than
the interview process.
Once again we consider the two ￿rm case (where ￿rm 1 makes no o⁄ers in
period 1). We now need to consider additional period 1 applicant draws that
will di⁄er between the interview process and random matching since under
random matching the L types won￿ t be screened. The expected di⁄erence
in total surplus between the two markets is:
ETS(Random) ￿ ETS(Interview)
= ￿(f2 ￿ f1)(pLpMM + pLpHH + pMpHH)
+p2
M(f1M ￿ (￿f1t + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ wM)) + pMpH(f2M ￿ (￿f1t + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ wM))
+pL(f2L + f1L ￿ 2(￿f1t + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ wL)) ￿ p2
L￿(f2 ￿ f1)t
+(1 ￿ pH)￿c:
This di⁄erence consists of four parts. The second part and the last part
are exactly the same as when the random matching with interviews model
was used. The ￿rst part is almost the same as well, omitting a part due to
the fact that ￿rms can￿ t screen in random matching. The third part is the
truly new part and arises because under random matching ￿rms end up with
L types. It re￿ ects the di⁄erence between the match with an L type and
the alternative, where the applicant and ￿rm get their outside options.19
In order to prove that random matching can yield a higher surplus,
we will prove that parts one and three of the expression above can get
small or become positive for certain parameters (and without violating any
18Propositon 3 holds also when ￿ = 1: Firm 1￿ s decision not to interview an applicant
who has no o⁄er is then e¢ cient, but Firm 2￿ s decision to interview its period 2 candidate
when it has an M or L candidate in period 1 exerts a negative externality on ￿rm 1. This
implies that for a small f2￿f1, our result that random matching with interviews is better
than the interview process still holds. We thank Tomas Sjostrom for raising this point.
19The third line is the simpli￿ed version of adding up the surplus from all of the states
in which a ￿rm gets stuck with an L applicant. The second term of the expression re￿ ects
that fact that when both applicants are L, ￿rm 2 won￿ t be matched even in the interview
process and there is some extra surplus lost.
12assumptions). We already have shown that part one can be made small
by decreasing the heterogeneity between ￿rms, f2 ￿ f1. Part three can be
made small or even positive by decreasing ￿. In the extreme, if ￿ was set
equal to zero, the expressions would be positive. This implies that if ￿rms
receive less of the surplus their mismatch becomes less important, and the
gain from the applicant￿ s point of view of matching can be larger. Notice
that reducing ￿ doesn￿ t violate any of our assumptions.20
It is clear that the two results in this section hold for a range of parameter
values. Furthermore, if we added more ￿rms and applicants, as long as there
was information-based or schedule-based unemployment for some draw, for
su¢ ciently low ￿rm heterogeneity, the expected surplus will be lower with
two rounds of interviews than with one round. If, in addition, the ￿rms￿
share of surplus is su¢ ciently low, then the expected surplus is lower with
two rounds of interviews than with random matching.
5 Changing the Information Structure
In the general model above, we have assumed that ￿rms know exactly which
￿rms are interviewing each applicant in each period, i.e. the interview sched-
ule and ￿rm productivities are common knowledge. Although this makes the
model more tractable, this may not be true in markets where there are more
than a few players. A ￿rm may not know with whom the applicant is sched-
uled to interview in the next period, with whom the applicant has previously
interviewed, or if she has received any o⁄ers. Indeed, an applicant may not
have incentives to reveal this information either. Hence in this section, we
look at an example where these assumptions are relaxed and prove that
information-based and schedule-based unemployment may still exist.
Consider an environment where ￿rms know the distribution of ￿rm pro-
ductivities, but do not observe which ￿rms are interviewing which applicants
or if any o⁄ers are made in the ￿rst period. To keep things simple (￿rms now
have to take expectations over what the whole sequence of ￿rms will do), our
example will involve only 3 ￿rms and 3 applicants.21 We assume it is com-
mon knowledge that the three ￿rms have productivities f3 > f2 > f1 > 0,
but each ￿rm only knows its own productivity.
Proposition 5 In the unobservable interviews game where A0-A2 hold, in
any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
20Alternatively, we could have made L larger or ￿ w and pL smaller to minimize part three.
However, the assumptions place strict constraints on manipulating these parameters.
21We need at least three ￿rms in order to make the non-identi￿ability of ￿rms have bite.
13i) Firm 3 makes its ￿rst-period applicant an o⁄er in period 1 or 2 if she is
of type H, and interviews its second-period applicant or makes her an o⁄er
without interviewing otherwise.
ii) Firm 1 never interviews or makes an o⁄er to its second-period applicant.
The proof is in the appendix.
The intuition for this result is that although ￿rm 3 does not know from
which ￿rm it will receive an applicant in period 2, it knows it has the highest
productivity of all ￿rms and will win any bidding competition. Likewise,
although ￿rm 1 does not does not know from which ￿rm it will receive an
applicant in period 2, it knows it has the lowest productivity and will lose
any bidding competition. Hence, these two ￿rms will act like the ￿rms in
the previous section with two ￿rms and two applicants. Firm 2, on the other
hand, will ￿nd it equally likely to receive an applicant from ￿rm 1 and ￿rm
3 and will choose to interview in period 2 if and only if this gives a higher
expected payo⁄ than not interviewing.
Proposition 5 immediately implies the following Corollary.
Corollary 2 In the unobservable interviews game where A0-A2 hold, in any
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and for any interview schedule, there exists a
draw of applicant productivities such that an applicant of type M will be
unemployed.
Consider the following example:
Firm 1 Firm 3 Firm 2
Period 1 x1 = H x3 = M x2 = H
Period 2 x3 = M x2 = H x1 = H
By Proposition 5, ￿rm 3 will hire applicant 2 and ￿rm 1 will not interview
applicant 3. Whether ￿rm 2 interviews applicant 1 or not depends on the
parameters (but it will not make applicant 1 an o⁄er without interviewing).
If ￿rm 2 interviews applicant 1, it will hire her and applicant 3 will be
unemployed while ￿rm 1 is unmatched. This is an example of information-
based unemployment in this model. If, on the other hand, ￿rm 2 does not
interview applicant 1, this applicant will be hired by ￿rm 1, and applicant
3 will be unemployed while and ￿rm 2 is unmatched. This is an example of
schedule-based unemployment.
146 Market Design
In this section, we use the tools of mechanism design theory to try to correct
ine¢ ciencies in the interview process. We will ￿rst show that if we allow
for payments from applicants, then the e¢ cient assortative match22 can be
achieved using a modi￿ed Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. We
then demonstrate that there exists a mechanism that can achieve e¢ ciency
without any transfers, by incorporating features of the market.
6.1 A VCG Mechanism
The mechanism design problem in our setting is similar to the assignment
problem of applicants with risk-neutral preferences to positions considered
by Leonard (1983). He developed a mechanism that is a special case of a
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism which works in our setting as well, sub-
ject to two amendments. The reasons for making these amendments is that
Leonard (1983) does not allow for reservation values and that he assumes
an equal number of applicants and ￿rms.
We can modify our model in two ways so that it ￿ts the requirements
of Leonard￿ s (1983) mechanism. First, we will assume that in addition to
the L;M; and H types of applicants in our standard model, there are F
￿reservation applicants￿of type t; where L < t < M as above, whose types
are known. If an applicant of type t is assigned to a ￿rm, this is equivalent
to saying that the ￿rm is not matched with any applicant. Furthermore,
type announcements are restricted to the set fL;M;Hg, i.e. no one can
announce that they are type t. In a similar vein we will assume that there
are X ￿reservation ￿rms￿of productivity ￿ w where, as above, ￿ w < minffig. If
an applicant is assigned to a reservation ￿rm, this is equivalent to saying that
the applicant is not matched with any ￿rm. Let X be the set of all applicants
of types L, t, M, and H, and let F be the set of ￿rms of productivities
￿ w;f1;:::;fF. Our assumptions imply that jFj = jXj = X + F:
Finally, an applicant j receives a surplus from matching with a ￿rm i
of (1 ￿ ￿)fixj ￿ p where p is the payment23 determined by the following
22We are assuming for this section that fiL < ￿fit + (1￿ ￿) ￿ wL, i.e. it is more e¢ cient
for ￿rms and applicants to remain unmatched if the applicant is an L type. This depends
on ￿. If this were not true, the match that we implement in the mechanisms would be
assortative, but not the most e¢ cient. Moreover, if we implemented the most e¢ cient
match where the constraint didn￿ t hold, we would violate ex-post individual rationality,
and potentially interim individual rationality, since the ￿rms would not want to be matched
with L types.
23Whether the payments go to the ￿rms or the third party will not a⁄ect incentives.
15mechanism:
1. Each non-reservation applicant j is asked to announce a type ~ xj 2
fL;M;Hg.
2. Sequentially and in descending order of productivity, every ￿rm in F
is then assigned to the applicant of highest (reported or known) type
remaining in X. If, at some stage, there are multiple applicants with
the highest type, then an applicant drawn at random among them is
assigned to the ￿rm with highest productivity among the remaining
ones.
3. Each non-reservation applicant j 2 X who was matched to a ￿rm i 2 F
has to make a payment p equal to (1￿￿) times the di⁄erence between
(a) the total (announced) surplus for all applicant-￿rm pairs if the
applicants in fX n jg are assigned to the ￿rms in F according to
the procedure in stage 2,24 and
(b) the total (announced) surplus for all applicant-￿rm pairs if the
applicants in X n j are matched with the ￿rms in F n i according
to the procedure in stage 2.
This mechanism achieves the e¢ cient assortative match as a Bayesian
equilibrium in dominant strategies (for a proof see Leonard (1983)). In the
mechanism, type L applicants are unmatched (since they are assigned to
reservation applicants) and pay zero transfers.
This mechanism satis￿es ex-post participation constraints for both ￿rms
and applicants in the sense that each participant receives at least his reserva-
tion utility. To see this, note that all ￿rms receive at least their reservation
utility in this mechanism as they will either be unmatched or matched with
an applicant of productivity M or H. Moreover, all applicants obtain a util-
ity greater than or equal to their reservation utility, since announcing type
L in step 2 ￿and thereby remaining unmatched ￿is a dominated strategy
for M and H types (and a dominant strategy for L types).
6.2 A Mechanism without Transfers
The previous mechanism achieved the ￿rst best in a simple manner, essen-
tially creating prices that would induce incentive compatibility. However, it
24A ￿rm not matched with either a reservation applicant or regular applicant is assumed
to have a surplus of zero.
16may be desirable to see if a mechanism can achieve a similar outcome with-
out transfers and instead using the interview technology introduced above,
where the ￿rst interview is free while the second incurs a cost of ￿c (of
course, the ￿rst best involves this cost never being incurred). The di¢ culty
in constructing such a mechanism is that we must rely on ￿rms to solicit
and reveal information truthfully, giving additional incentive constraints.
Nevertheless, we can implement the ￿rst-best solution as a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium with the following mechanism:
1. Each applicant j is asked to announce a type ^ xj 2 fL;M;Hg to a
third party.
2. All applicants who announced L are placed in a pool of unmatched
applicants.
3. Take the unmatched ￿rm with the highest productivity, match it with
the applicant of the highest announced productivity (randomize if
there are multiple applicants of this productivity), continue with the
next highest ￿rm until all ￿rms are matched or there are no more ap-
plicants reporting H or M. If, at the end of this procedure, there are
applicants left, they are placed in the pool of unmatched applicants.
4. Have the ￿rms interview the applicants they are matched with. Each
￿rm j matched with an applicant reports a type for the applicant
￿ xj 2 fL;M;Hg to a third party.
5. If the ￿rm￿ s report doesn￿ t match the applicant￿ s reported type (^ xj 6=
￿ xj), the applicant is placed in the pool of misreporting applicants.
6. If an applicant is taken out in step 5, repeat step 3 for all ￿rms and
the applicants not in the unmatched and misreporting pools.
7. Allow the ￿rms that are matched with applicants at the end of step
6 to hire them. If they are hired, the applicant and the ￿rm split
the surplus generated according to the sharing rule ￿. If they are not
hired, they are placed in the pool of unmatched applicants.
8. If there are unmatched applicants and unmatched ￿rms, randomly as-
sign applicants ￿rst from the unmatched pool and thereafter from the
misreporting pool among the remaining ￿rms. Let each ￿rm matched
in this way know from which pool its applicant was drawn and allow
it to interview and/or hire the applicant.
17Proposition 6 In the above mechanism, there is a Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium where all ￿rms and applicants report truthfully and contract assor-
tatively.
The proof is in the appendix.
This mechanism achieves the assortative match with zero interview costs.
This is accomplished with zero transfers and using the ￿rms￿interviewing
ability to provide incentives for applicants to state their types truthfully.
In particular, all applicants of type H and M and all ￿rms (except possi-
bly the ￿rm with the lowest productivity if X = F) have strict incentives
to announce truthfully. The mechanism also satis￿es ex-post participation
constraints in the sense that it gives each participant a payo⁄ greater than
or equal to his reservation payo⁄.
7 Conclusion
Understanding decentralized labor markets is critical to understanding the
dynamics of unemployment and mismatch. In a simple model describing
the interview process for professional labor markets, we have pointed out
potentially large ine¢ ciencies, chief among them information-based unem-
ployment. Information-based unemployment occurs when applicants￿types
are private information and ￿rms decide not to interview or hire an appli-
cant who previously had an interview but no job o⁄er to show from it. This
could cause good applicants to go unemployed and productive vacancies to
go un￿lled. Randomly matching applicants to ￿rms may be more productive
than this interview process. We detail two mechanisms that can make the
market e¢ cient.
Our work suggests several directions for future research. First, changing
the setting to allow for strategic wage setting and idiosyncratic preferences
among ￿rms and applicants are natural extensions. Second, analyzing in-
terview markets for non-entry level applicants poses interesting challenges.
Lastly, recent practical contributions by Roth, Cawley, Levine, Niederle and
Siegfried (2007) to the economics job market hold signi￿cant promise, and
are worth examining in further detail for their application to other markets.
Appendix
Lemma 1 In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the general model, a ￿rm
with a ￿rst-period applicant of type H who is matched with no ￿rm or a ￿rm
18of lower productivity in the second period, hires this applicant ￿either in the
￿rst or the second period.
Proof. Let ￿rm i denote a ￿rm whose ￿rst-period applicant j; of pro-
ductivity xj = H; is matched with no ￿rm or a ￿rm of lower productivity in
the second period. First note that since applicant j knows the productivity
of the ￿rms it will be matched with in the ￿rst and second period, it will
always accept an o⁄er from ￿rm i, either in the ￿rst or the second period.
Second, it is clear that ￿rm i will never interview a possible second-period
applicant j + 1 since it would thereby incur the interview cost without any
possibility of being matched with a more productive applicant. Third, there
is no equilibrium where ￿rm i hires applicant j +1 without interviewing. If
￿rm i were to hire applicant j + 1 without interviewing, it would have to
have the equilibrium posterior beliefs that xj+1 = H with probability one.
Such beliefs are only possible if there is a ￿rm i + 1 interviewing applicant
j +1 that makes her an o⁄er in the ￿rst period with positive probability i⁄
she is of type H or that makes her an o⁄er i⁄she is not of type H. However,
neither can be an equilibrium strategy for ￿rm i + 1 since it could then
pro￿tably deviate by not making an o⁄er if xj+1 = H (or making an o⁄er
if xj+1 = H, respectively) in the ￿rst period and thereby preventing ￿rm i
from hiring the applicant in the second period.
Lemma 2 In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the general model, a
￿rm with a ￿rst-period applicant who is not of type H and a second-period
applicant who was unmatched or matched with a ￿rm of lower productivity
in the ￿rst period, either interviews its second-period applicant or hires her
without interviewing.
Proof. Let ￿rm i be a ￿rm with a ￿rst-period applicant j of productivity
xj = ?; M or L (where ? represents no applicant) and a second-period
applicant j + 1; who was interviewed by a less productive ￿rm i + 1 or no
￿rm in the ￿rst period. It follows trivially from A2 and A0 that ￿rm i
interviews applicant j+1 (or makes her an o⁄er without interviewing) if she
is not interviewed by any ￿rm in period 1. The same argument applies if
she is interviewed by a less productive ￿rm i + 1 that makes an o⁄er to
all types or applicant, no type of applicant, or randomizes between these
two strategies in period 1. Finally, consider the case when applicant j+1 is
interviewed by a less productive ￿rm i + 1 that makes a ￿rst-period o⁄er
with a probability that depends on the type of applicant j + 1. Suppose
that there is an equilibrium such that ￿rm i with positive probability neither
19interviews nor makes an o⁄er without interviewing after observing action Y
(an o⁄er or no o⁄er) by ￿rm i + 1 in the ￿rst period. Then ￿rm i must
weakly prefer not to interview applicant j + 1 and not to hire her without
interviewing after observing action Y . Moreover, by A2, it must strictly
prefer to interview her after observing the complementary action Y C: This
means that in equilibrium, ￿rm i+1 must employ Y whenever matched with
an applicant of type xj+1 = M or H; thereby making sure that ￿rm i does
not pursue applicant j + 1. However, this contradicts the fact that ￿rm j
weakly prefers not to interview after observing action Y:
Lemma 3 In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the general open o⁄er
game, a ￿rm never interviews or makes an o⁄er to a second-period applicant
who was matched with a ￿rm of higher productivity in the ￿rst period.
Proof. By Lemma 1, a ￿rm i receiving an applicant j + 1 from a more
productive ￿rm i+1 in the second period will never be able hire this appli-
cant if xj+1 = H. If xj+1 = M, she will be able to hire this applicant only
if ￿rm i+1 does not make her an o⁄er. This is conditional upon i+1 being
matched with another applicant j + 2 (who is identical to j in the case of
only two ￿rms) in the second period. More speci￿cally, it occurs either if the
parameters are such that ￿rm i + 1 makes an o⁄er without interviewing to
applicant j+2 in the second round or if she interviews j+2 and xj+2 = M or
H: Hence, ￿rm i￿ s incremental expected payo⁄ from interviewing applicant
j+1 is at most ￿fjpM (M ￿ t)=(pL + pM)￿￿c and from making her an of-
fer without interviewing at most ￿fj (pM (M ￿ t) + pL(t ￿ L))=(pL + pM).
The ￿rst is negative by A1 and the second by A0.
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.
(ii) First note that ￿rm 1 will never make an o⁄er to applicant 1 if x1 = L.
Since, by Lemma 1, ￿rm 2 will hire applicant 2 if x2 = H in any equilibrium,
there is a positive probability that such an o⁄er would be accepted, giving
a strictly worse payo⁄ than the outside option. There are two possibilities.
Either (a) ￿rm 1 makes applicant 1 an o⁄er with positive probability in the
￿rst period if x1 = M or H or (b) ￿rm 1 never makes an o⁄er in period 1.
(a) By Lemma 2, when x2 6= H, ￿rm 2 will make applicant 1 an o⁄er
without interviewing if it observes an o⁄er in the ￿rst period and either make
an o⁄er to applicant 1 or hire her without interviewing if it does not observe
any o⁄er. This means that its expected payo⁄ from either interviewing or
20making an o⁄er to applicant 1 conditional upon not observing any o⁄er must
be at least as large as that of hiring applicant 2 (if x2 = M) or the outside
option (if x2 = L). Letting rM denote the probability that ￿rm 1 does not
make an o⁄er in period 1 conditional upon x1 = M; and letting rH denote
the probability that ￿rm 1 does not make an o⁄er in period 1 conditional
upon x1 = H, at least one of the following two conditions must be ful￿lled:
f2(
1
pL + rMpM + rHpH
)(pLM + rMpMM + rHpHH) ￿ c ￿ f2M
f2(
1
pL + rMpM + rHpH
)(pLL + rMpMM + rHpHH) ￿ f2M:
The ￿rst condition says that ￿rm 2 will interview its period 2 applicant.
The second says that it will hire its period 2 applicant without interviewing.
For rH su¢ ciently close to one, the ￿rst inequality is ful￿lled, by A2. For
rH su¢ ciently close to zero, neither of the inequalities are ful￿lled.
(b) In the degenerate case when rH = rM = 1, an equilibrium exists
provided the beliefs of ￿rm 2 o⁄ the equilibrium path are such that f2 will
interview x1 or make her an o⁄er without interviewing after observing an
o⁄er. The ex-ante beliefs and beliefs ful￿lling the Intuitive Criterion are
examples of such beliefs.
From Lemma 3, it follows that ￿rm 1 will never interview or make an
o⁄er to applicant 2. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Follows from Lemma 3.
(ii) First, note that unemployment trivially occurs when F < X. We
therefore focus on the situation where F = X. Consider a sequence of at
least three ￿rms (for the case of two ￿rms and two applicants the statement
follows by Proposition 1 above). De￿ne a local maximizer to be a ￿rm that
has a higher productivity than both the ￿rm it gives an applicant to in
period 2 and the ￿rm that it receives an applicant from in period 2 ￿i.e. if
we arrange ￿rms in a circle such that the applicant matched with ￿rm k in
period 1 (whose productivity we denote as xk) is matched with ￿rm k ￿ 1
in period 2, ￿rm i is a local maximizer if and only if fi￿1 < fi > fi+1. It
is obvious that at least one local maximizer must exist for any sequence of
￿rms. Let xi and xi+1 be the productivity of ￿rm i￿ s ￿rst and second-period
applicants respectively. By Lemma 2, ￿rm i will interview an applicant of
productivity xi+1 (or make her an o⁄er without interviewing) if xi = L or
M. If, in addition, xi+1 = M or H (this condition is not necessary if ￿rm i
21makes an o⁄er without interviewing) it will hire her. By Lemma 3, ￿rm i￿1
will neither interview nor make any o⁄er to applicant i Hence, an applicant
i of type M will be unemployed if xi+1 = M or H (and also if xi+1 = L
provided that ￿rm i makes an o⁄er without interviewing). ￿
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Since the type of the applicant in period 2 is uncertain and interviewing
is costly then, ￿rm 3 will always make an o⁄er to its ￿rst-period applicant if
she is of type H. By assumption A2, ￿rm 3 will either interview its second-
period applicant or make her an o⁄er without interviewing if its ￿rst-period
applicant is of type M or L.
(ii) Firm 1 will not interview its second-period applicant or make her
any o⁄er without interviewing since it will never be able to hire such an
applicant of type H and therefore the probability of obtaining an applicant
of type M is less than or equal to pM=(pM + pL): To see this, note that
with probability 1/2 it receives an applicant from ￿rm 3 that (by part (i)
of the proposition) always hires an applicant of type H and only passes on
a ￿rst-period applicant of type M if it interviews an applicant of type M
or H in period 2 (or makes the second-period applicant an o⁄er without
interviewing). With probability 1/2 it receives an applicant from ￿rm 2.
By A0, ￿rm 2 will never make an o⁄er without interviewing in the second
period if its ￿rst-period applicant is of type H. Whether ￿rm 2 interviews
in period 2 depends on the parameters, but should it interview, by (i), it
will never be able to hire its second-period applicant if she is of type H and
was received from ￿rm 3. This implies that ￿rm 1 will never be able to hire
its second-period applicant if she is of type H and was received from ￿rm
2.25 ￿
Proof of Proposition 6
Step 8. Firms will only interview (make o⁄ers without interviewing to)
applicants from the unmatched and misreporting pools if the expected payo⁄
gain is greater than the cost of interviewing (the outside option).
Step 7. A ￿rm will hire the applicant it is matched with if the (expected)
payo⁄ is at least as high as the expected payo⁄ from hiring someone from
25This depends on how o⁄ers are made at the end of the second period. It is true both
if we assume that ￿rms can make a second o⁄er in period 2 if their ￿rst o⁄er is rejected
and if ￿rms may wait until the resolution of ￿rst-period o⁄ers to make their second-period
o⁄ers. Notice that we have not needed to specify how o⁄ers are made in period two for
our other results.
22the pools in step 8.
Step 4. Suppose ￿rst that all ￿rms believe applicants report truthfully.
Let m be the number of applicants reporting a type of at least M and
rank ￿rms in order of productivity such that ￿rm F is the most productive
and ￿rm 1 the least productive. It is strictly better for ￿rm F to report
the type of the applicant it is matched with since by reporting truthfully
the ￿rm obtains the applicant with probability one if she is of type M or
H (and throws her out if she, o⁄ the equilibrium path, is of type L). By
misrepresenting, the ￿rm will either remain unmatched or be matched with
an applicant of lower or equal productivity, either in step 6 or in step 8.
Deducing the decision of ￿rm F, ￿rm F ￿1 knows that if it is matched with
an applicant of type H (respectively, M), then by announcing truthfully, it
will be matched with the H (respectively, M) type with probability one. By
misrepresenting the type of the applicant, the ￿rm obtains a lower or equal
surplus with probability one. Continuing in this fashion, we see that unless
X = m = F all ￿rms have strict incentives to report truthfully. In case
X = m = F, then ￿rm 1 is indi⁄erent between reporting truthfully or not
since it can always hire the same applicant from the misreporting pool by
making an o⁄er without interviewing.
Step 1. Under the beliefs that all other applicants and all ￿rms matched
with an applicant in step 3 report truthfully, an applicant of type L is indif-
ferent between reporting or misreporting. By reporting truthfully, she will
be placed in the pool of unmatched applicants in step 2. By misreporting,
she will either be placed in the pool of misreporting applicants in step 5 or ￿
if m > F and she is not matched with any ￿rm in step 3 ￿in the unmatched
pool in step 3. No applicant of type L will be hired if we assume that the
beliefs o⁄ the equilibrium path about the applicants in the misreporting
pool are such that no unmatched ￿rm, by A0, would make an o⁄er to any
member of this pool without interviewing.
Maintaining the beliefs that all other applicants and all ￿rms matched
with an applicant in step 3 report truthfully, applicants of type M have
strict incentives to report truthfully:
a) Conditional on the event that ^ m < F other applicants report a type
of at least M, reporting truthfully implies being hired by any ￿rm i ￿ F ￿ ^ m
with positive probability and remaining unemployed with zero probability.
Falsely reporting type H or L instead implies that the applicant is placed
in the misreporting pool and that she can be hired only by ￿rms i ￿ F ￿ ^ m
(assuming the applicant is matched with such a ￿rm in step 8 and the beliefs
of this ￿rm are such that it would actually interview someone from this pool).
b) Conditional on ^ m ￿ F other applicants reporting a type of at least
23M, truthfully reporting M implies being hired by any ￿rm with positive
probability or being placed in the unmatched pool with a probability p > 0.
Falsely reporting H implies being placed in the unmatched pool in step 3
with a probability q 2 (0;p), and in the misreporting pool in step 5 with
probability 1 ￿ q. In the latter event, the only ￿rm remaining unmatched
after step 6 ￿￿rm 1 ￿will be assigned an applicant from the non-empty
unmatched pool in step 8. Falsely reporting type L in the event that ^ m ￿
F also does not pay o⁄ implies since the applicant is then placed in the
unmatched pool in step 2 and remains unemployed with probability one.
The proof for applicants of type H is analogous to the case of applicants
of type M except for the fact that the probability of being placed in the
unmatched pool in step 3 is equal to one after falsely reporting M when
there are ^ h ￿ F other applicants reporting H. ￿
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